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2. INTRODUCTION 
 
The twentieth century saw the United States become the world’s largest consumer of 
energy. As the lifeblood of security, prosperity, and in many ways U.S. society, energy 
has featured heavily as a factor in U.S. foreign policy. Concerns regarding energy were 
made particularly acute as a result of a number of oil crises in the 1970s, when the 
image of long lines of cars queuing outside gas stations was etched into the American 
psyche. Energy came to be seen as a strategic vulnerability for the U.S., especially as a 
result of declining domestic production and ever increasing import dependency. Thus, 
over the last four decades energy became a crucial objective of U.S. grand strategy, 
helping shape political, economic, military, and diplomatic strategies. However, the last 
ten years has seen a remarkable transformation in the U.S. energy position. The 
country is now the world’s largest producer of natural gas and is challenging Russia and 
Saudi Arabia to be the world’s top crude oil producer. This transition has occurred as a 
result of a boom in U.S. domestic oil and gas production that has been termed the shale 
revolution. As a result of this massive transformation, attention has focused on the 
implications for U.S. foreign policy and how the U.S. can utilise its new energy 
abundance in its external energy relations and to advance its foreign policy goals. 
The transformation in the U.S. energy position has provided it with massive 
economic benefits. However, the primary focus of this paper is to analyse how the shale 
revolution has affected U.S. energy strategies and its international agenda. Many 
scholars, policymakers, and commentators have argued that it provides the U.S. with 
enormous strategic advantages that increases its geopolitical power and allows it to 
better achieve its foreign policy goals.1 Over the last ten years, the narrative in the U.S. 
has changed from one concerned with import dependency and energy scarcity, to one 
of abundance and opportunity. The popular media has featured headlines such as “Oil 
Boom Gives the U.S. a New Edge in Energy and Diplomacy” and “U.S. Strategy to Free 
                                            
1 See for instance: Meghan O’Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics 
and Strengthens American Power (Simon & Schuster 2017); Robert Blackwill, and Meghan O’Sullivan, 
‘America’s Energy Edge: The Geopolitical Consequences of the Shale Revolution’ (2014) 93 Foreign 
Affairs 102; Carlos Pascual, ‘The New Geopolitics of Energy’ (2015) Columbia Center on Global Energy 
Policy. 
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European Energy Markets from Russia's Grip Taking Shape”.2 The rhetoric of 
policymakers regarding America’s energy position has performed a U-turn in recent 
years, starting under the Obama administration and continuing under Trump. U.S. 
policymakers now talk about ‘energy dominance’ and an era of ‘new energy realism.’ 
The thinking behind this ‘energy dominance’ policy is that the drastic change in 
America’s energy position provides it with a new toolkit in its foreign policy and a new 
leverage over foreign adversaries.  
 
2.1 Research Puzzle 
A lot of literature has focused on the close relationship between energy and foreign 
policy in U.S. grand strategy, particularly U.S. import dependency.3 Given the dramatic 
change in America’s energy position as a result of the shale revolution, and the varying 
pronouncements on the political benefits of this, it is important to understand the ways 
in which the U.S is seeking to capitalise on its new energy abundance. This thesis 
focuses specifically on the strategies adopted by U.S. policymakers in relation to oil and 
gas as a result of its new energy abundance. In doing so it addresses the theoretical 
approaches that have informed these strategies. This paper argues that the strategies 
employed to use the shale revolution for U.S. benefit and to advance its international 
agenda are restricted by a number of limitations that mitigate against their success. 
Bearing this in mind, the research puzzle that the paper presents is:  
Why has the U.S. not always been successful in utilising the shale revolution to 
advance its foreign policy goals, despite employing a number of strategies aimed 
at this? 
The purpose of this paper is to look at the strategies the U.S. has utilised relating to 
energy in order to advance its foreign policy goals and the areas where it has found 
success and where it has faced limitations. This is demonstrated using an empirical 
approach through two case studies and a theoretical framework that builds on 
                                            
2 Clifford Krauss, ‘Oil Boom Gives the U.S. a New Edge in Energy and Diplomacy’ The New York Times 
(January 28, 2018); Collin Eaton, ‘U.S. Strategy To Free European Energy Markets From Russia's Grip 
Taking Shape’ Houston Chronicle (August 16, 2016). 
3  See for instance: Jan Kalicki, and David Goldwyn, Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in 
Transition (2nd edn, Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2013); Bruce Jones, and David Steven, The Risk 
Pivot: Great Powers, International Security, and the Energy Revolution (Brookings Institution Press 2015). 
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International Political Economy (IPE) approaches to energy affairs. The first case study 
focuses on the role of U.S. shale/tight oil in helping secure the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), more commonly known as the Iran deal. The 
second case study looks at European energy security, namely natural gas in Europe. 
These are both cited as cases where the shale revolution has played an important role 
in assisting with U.S. foreign policy goals and advancing its international agenda.4 The 
case studies show that the success of the strategies adopted by the U.S. in employing 
energy in its foreign policy depends on the extent to which they are based on a political-
economic framework. Where the strategies adopted were reflective of the divergence 
between realist and liberal approaches to energy relations and were too concerned with 
either political or economic factors, their success was limited. 
The strategies employed by the U.S. in response to the shale revolution are 
divided into two approaches - energy leverage and energy stability. These approaches 
reflect the divide in the literature on international energy politics along the lines of 
realism and liberalism. Energy leverage “views the energy advantages presented by 
U.S. oil and gas production as tools that can be employed in the service of broader 
geopolitical or economic objectives.”5 The emphasis is on maximising U.S. oil and gas 
production so as to increase American power and relative capabilities, and in this way 
we can see that it relates to realism. Under an energy stability approach, “the U.S. 
energy advantage should be used to enhance energy security around the world, on the 
theory that more stable energy markets will foster strong economies and enhance 
geopolitical stability.”6 This is in line with a liberal understanding of energy relations. 
Dividing the strategies along such theoretical lines limits their effectiveness because 
they are unable to take account of both economic and political systems simultaneously 
                                            
4 See for instance: O’Sullivan (n 1) p 121-127; Gabriel Collins, and Anna Mikulska, ‘Gas Geoeconomics in 
Europe: Using Strategic Investments to Promote Market Liberalization, Counterbalance Russian 
Revanchism, and Enhance European Energy Security’ (2018) Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public 
Policy Working Paper. 
5 Sarah Ladislaw, Maren Leed, Molly A. Walton, ‘New Energy, New Geopolitics - Background Report 3: 
Scenarios, Strategies, and Pathways’ (2014) A Report of the CSIS Energy and National Security Program 
and the Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies, p 18. 
6 Ibid, p 17. 
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and the interaction of these in shaping energy developments. This paper builds on 
recent scholarship in international energy affairs that seeks to bring energy within IPE.7  
 
2.2 Thesis Structure 
The paper starts by providing the key statistics that show the extent of the U.S. energy 
transition. Section four contains a literature review focusing on the existing theoretical 
explanations for international energy affairs. This focuses on the use of realism and 
liberalism as the primary theoretical approaches in the analysis of international energy 
affairs. The links between these and the energy leverage and energy stability 
approaches are explained. Following this, the IPE framework that is used to analyse the 
U.S. strategies is outlined. The next section details the specifics of the strategies utilised 
by the U.S., based on whether they are an energy leverage or energy stability measure. 
The research design and methodology section looks at the types of research to be 
conducted, how the analysis will be carried out, and why the case studies under study 
were selected. The two case studies evaluate how the U.S. strategies have played out 
in reality, and the areas where they have found success or where they have come up 
short. The final two sections contain a case studies analysis and conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7 See for instance: Caroline Kuzemko, Andrei V. Belyi, Andreas Goldthau, and Michael F. Keating (eds) 
Dynamics of Energy Governance in Europe and Russia (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Edward Stoddard, 
‘Reconsidering the Ontological Foundations of International Energy Affairs: Realist Geopolitics, Market 
Liberalism and a Politico-Economic Alternative’ (2013) 22(4) European Security 437; Thijs Van de Graaf, 
Benjamin Sovacool, Arunabha Ghosh, Florian Kern, and Michael Klare (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of 
the International Political Economy of Energy (Palgrave Macmillan 2016). 
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3. THE SHALE REVOLUTION IN CONTEXT 
 
3.1 Definitions and Statistics 
The single biggest factor in America’s energy transition has been the ‘shale’ or 
‘unconventional’ revolution. Unconventional energy refers to methods required to extract 
oil and gas resources that are different to those that are considered conventional. 
Conventional resources are those which reside in large reservoirs and can be tapped 
and drained with a small number of wells (think of your typical oil or gas rig).8 While 
there are many different types of unconventional energy, when we use the term in 
relation to energy in the U.S. we are primarily referring to oil and gas that is extracted 
from shale rock. Shale gas and tight oil are extracted from shale rock using the process 
of hydraulic fracturing or ‘fracking’ and horizontal drilling. These processes were 
developed throughout the second half of the twenty-century but it was around the year 
2008 when a commercial onset occurred and started to have a dramatic effect on U.S 
production.9 Since 2008, ever increasing technological advances in unconventional oil 
and gas production in the U.S. has led to drastic increases in production levels and 
decreasing operating costs. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‘shale revolution’ 
will be used as the umbrella term to refer to the large increase in domestic oil and gas 
production in the U.S. over the last ten years. The term ‘tight oil’ is used when referring 
to oil produced from the U.S. shale formations and the term ‘shale gas’ is used for gas 
from these formations. 
 The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2017 says that the rise in U.S. production of 
tight oil and shale gas is set to match or exceed the largest sustained rise in production 
ever seen in any other country.10 U.S. production of crude oil has increased from just 
under 5 mb/d in 2008 to 9.3 mb/d in 2017.11 The EIA expects average annual U.S. 
production to reach 10.3 mb/d in 2018, which would surpass the highest U.S. annual 
                                            
8 Meghan O’Sullivan (n 1) p 18. 
9 Sarah Ladislaw, Maren Leed, Molly A. Walton, ‘New Energy, New Geopolitics - Background Report 1: 
Energy Impacts’ (2014) A Report of the CSIS Energy and National Security Program and the Harold 
Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies, p 6-7. 
10 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2017 (OECD/IEA 2017), p 70. 
11 EIA, ‘U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil’ (2018). 
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average on record of 9.6 mb/d set in 1970.12 As a point of comparison, in 2016 both 
Russia and Saudi Arabia produced an average of 10.5 mb/d of crude oil. Tight oil has 
been the driving force behind the increase in overall U.S. crude oil production, making 
up 54% of the total production in 2017.13 The increase in U.S. production has meant 
that net imports of crude oil and petroleum products decreased from 12.5 mb/d in 2005 
(60 percent of U.S. consumption) to 3.7 mb/d in 2017 (19 percent of U.S. 
consumption).14 
U.S. increases in natural gas production as a result of shale gas have been 
similarly breathtaking and the U.S. is now the world’s largest producer of natural gas. 
U.S. production has increased by almost 50 percent since 2005 from just under 50 bcf/d 
to 73.6 bcf/d in 2017 (slightly below the record production set in 2015). In 2005, just 6 
percent of natural gas produced in the U.S. came from shale gas but by 2017 this was 
over 60 percent.15 As a result of these increases, for the first time in 60 years the U.S. is 
now a net exporter of natural gas. This natural gas is exported via pipelines to Mexico 
and Canada, and increasingly further afield as LNG. LNG exports have increased 
significantly from the U.S. in the past two years as a result of two LNG export facilities 
coming into operation, with further projects set to come online in the next two years.16  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
12 EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2018 (EIA 2018), p 43. 
13 Ibid. 
14 EIA, ‘U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products’ (2018). 
15 O’Sullivan (n 1) p 23. 
16 Howard Rogers, ‘The Impact of US LNG Exports on the International LNG Market’ in ‘What’s Next for 
U.S. Energy Policy?’ (2017) 111 Oxford Energy Forum, p 23.  
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4. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AFFAIRS 
 
This section considers the main IR approaches that are adopted in the literature relating 
to international energy affairs and the use of energy in foreign policy - realism and 
liberalism. The central positions of each theory are outlined, along with showing how 
they relate to the strategies of energy leverage and energy stability respectively. 
Further, it is shown how these theories each ignore important elements that hinder the 
effective study of international energy affairs and can lead to ineffective policies. Many 
contemporary accounts of international energy affairs and energy relations are broadly 
framed within either realist/geopolitical or liberal/neoliberal frameworks. Stoddard notes 
that the nature of these competing paradigms contributes to perceived divisions in the 
field of energy studies between pessimistic-realist and optimistic/rationalist-liberal 
accounts.17 He goes on to say that such divergent approaches tend to favour either the 
political or economic aspects of energy affairs, and in this way privilege “either the inter-
state political or transnational economic structures of the global energy system in their 
analyses.”18 
 
4.1 Realism and Energy 
At the core of the realist paradigm is the belief that international affairs is a struggle for 
power among self-interested states.19 All realist theories regard the nature of the actors 
as being unitary and in anarchy.20 The unitary actors established as the fundamental 
actors in international politics are states and anarchy exists between states as there is 
no central authority to enforce agreements or assist states under duress.21 This system 
of anarchy means that states compete with each other for power and resources and this 
                                            
17 Stoddard (n 7) p 437-438. 
18 Ibid, p 438. 
19 Stephen Walt, ‘International Relations: One World, Many Theories’ (1998) 110 Foreign Policy 29. 
20 Jeffrey Legro, and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’ (1999) 24(2) International Security 
5, p 9. 
21 Thomas Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy (Stanford 
University Press 2015), p 30. 
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competition is viewed in zero-sum terms.22 Control over resources lies at the heart of 
realism and material resources exercise influence on state behaviour. 
 Much of the literature on energy politics adopts a broad realist perspective that 
emphasises competition for energy resources, the power that comes with their control, 
and the increasing use of energy as a political tool in foreign policy. Energy is 
increasingly seen as a competitive advantage for states and it increases the 
opportunities for strong energy producers to project their national interests and increase 
their influence.23 Thus, control of resources is seen as a crucial element of the struggle 
for power in the international system and is a part of its zero-sum nature. Given that 
states are said to act in their own self-interest, countries that are powerful energy 
exporters view energy as a part of global power politics and are willing to utilise this in 
their foreign policies.24 
Caiser refers to this by saying that the most dominant view in the study of energy 
relations reflects a vague neo-realist perspective where energy relations are seen as a 
crucial element in the struggle for power between states.25 Factors such as the 
resurgence of Russia as a major energy producer in the 2000s and the neo-mercantilist 
approach of China helped fuel such realist accounts of energy relations. Luft and Korin 
argue that energy exporters are increasingly using energy to advance their foreign 
policy agenda and that Russia’s status as a gas exporter to Europe has given it 
significant political leverage and weakened European economic security.26 Klare argues 
that China’s efforts to secure energy overseas could lead it into a resource conflict with 
the U.S. and he asserts that energy is likely to be one of the sparks for major power 
conflict in the future.27 
                                            
22 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
World Politics (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2014). 
23 Tom Caiser, ‘Russia’s Energy Leverage over the EU: Myth or Reality?’ (2011) 12(4) Perspectives on 
European Politics and Society 493 p 495. 
24 Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Energy Security Challenges for the 21st Century: A Reference Handbook 
(Greenwood Publishing 2009), p 340. 
25 Caiser (n 23) p 494. 
26 Luft and Korin (n 24), p 335. 
27 Michael Klare, ‘There Will Be Blood: Political Violence, Regional Warfare, and the Risk of Great-Power 
Conflict over Contested Energy Sources’ in Gal Luft, and Anne Korin, Energy Security Challenges for the 
21st Century: A Reference Handbook (Greenwood Publishing 2009). 
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4.1.1 Realism and Energy Leverage 
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) carried out a study in 2014 of 
the impact of the shale revolution on geopolitics, U.S. national security, and the future 
strategic options available to U.S. policymakers.28 A main report, along with three 
background reports were published. Background report three, titled New Energy, New 
Geopolitics - Background Report 3: Scenarios, Strategies, and Pathways, notes that 
there are two strategic pathways available to the U.S. in terms of how it incorporates the 
shale revolution in its energy policy and foreign policy - energy leverage and energy 
stability.29 The energy leverage strategic pathway “views the energy advantages 
presented by U.S. oil and gas production as tools that can be employed in the service of 
broader geopolitical or economic objectives.”30 Under this approach, the U.S. seeks to 
maximise its domestic production of oil and natural gas, and use the resulting energy 
supplies and its increase in material capability as tools to better achieve its international 
objectives and improve its geopolitical power. This strategy can manifest itself in a 
number of ways, such as through targeting or limiting its exports of oil and natural gas, 
increasing its use of economic sanctions against other energy producers, or attempting 
to use its new power to assert its interests in its energy diplomacy. This strategy is 
reflective of the realist approach to international energy relations, whereby energy is 
used in a way that reflects self-interest and competition.  
 
4.1.2 Limitations of Realist approaches to Energy 
Realist approaches to energy politics tend to focus on the actions of states and 
systemic factors such as the balance of power and the anarchical system of states. 
They are generally pessimistic regarding the potential for state interaction. The political 
intentions of the states that control energy resources are especially important, rather 
than resources themselves or economic considerations. While economic factors are not 
                                            
28 Ladislaw et al. (n 9) p 2. 
29 Ladislaw et al. (n 5). 
30 Ladislaw et al. (n 5) p 18. 
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rejected outright by realists, they are generally seen as being inferior to state 
preferences such as the balance of power and national security. 
There are a number of critiques that can be made against the realist approaches 
to energy politics. The scholars attempting to bring energy within IPE argue that realist 
approaches tend to focus on the access to resources and ignore the economic aspects 
of energy. Kuzemko et al. say they “centre on states as units of analysis, while ignoring 
the ever-growing role of transnational actors, such as national energy companies, as 
well as global externalities and spill-overs.”31 Drawing on the study of state 
transformation, this brings to mind Hameiri and Jones’ criticism that realism fails to 
account for how states have transformed under globalisation to be more disaggregated 
or decentralised. This results in power and resources being distributed to a variety of 
social and commercial actors, and this creates internal differences that mitigate against 
a single national position or grand strategy.32 Stoddard notes the state-centricity and 
overarching emphasis on interstate relations in realism and says that this can negate 
consideration of the interactions between political factors and the economic system.33 
Judge et al note the tendency to reduce actions in energy relations to those of the 
geopolitical intentions of governments. They say it must be understood that energy 
relations are extremely complex and multidimensional relationships and involve a 
number of interests and actors, not just those of the states.34 
 
4.2 Liberalism and Energy 
Market liberalism emphasises free trade and a market or capitalist economy as a 
means to peace and prosperity. Liberal approaches to energy relations look at how 
markets and institutions can be used to ensure energy security, strengthen cooperation 
and interdependence between states, and facilitate a more peaceful international 
environment. Liberals favour the concept of absolute gains in which state interactions 
                                            
31 Kuzemko et al (n 7) p 2. 
32 Shahar Hameiri, and Lee Jones, ‘Rising Powers and State Transformation: The Case of China’ (2016) 
22(1) European Journal of International Relations 72, p 75. 
33 Stoddard (n 7) p 444. 
34 Andrew Judge, Tomas Maltby, and Jack Sharples, ‘Challenging Reductionism in Analyses of EU-
Russia Energy Relations’ (2016) 21(4) Geopolitics 751. 
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are seen as win-win and this is best achieved through a market system based on the 
dynamics of supply and demand. An important aspect of market liberalism relates to the 
pacifying effect of economic interdependence, whereby strong economic relations are 
said to help maintain peace as the economic costs of going to war are too high. Liberals 
say that there are multiple actors whose preferences shape foreign policy, rather than 
just states competing in the international system. However, for liberals, markets play the 
most important role in energy systems and create interdependence between energy 
producers and consumers. 
The market creates interdependence between its participants through prices and 
mutual dependence. Price interdependence is particularly relevant in the oil market. As 
the oil market is global in nature, a disruption in supply in one area will affect the supply 
to the global market and there will be an increase in global prices. Thus, energy 
independence is shown to be a futile endeavour as even if a country is not importing 
any oil, it is still vulnerable to price spikes from supply disruptions elsewhere. 
Interdependence is further encouraged by the fact that energy producing and 
consuming states have compatible interests in that the producers benefit from stable 
demand for their product at a fair price, while consumers benefit from a stable supply of 
their energy requirements. 
In assessing how the U.S. should use its new energy abundance, liberals argue it 
that it should be used to increase market stability and create interdependence between 
countries. Therefore, under a liberal approach, foreign policy will look to ensure that 
global markets are adequately supplied and that there is cooperation and dialogue 
between energy producers and suppliers. Recent literature has sought to recommend 
that a liberal based approach be taken by policymakers in advancing U.S. interests on 
the back of the shale revolution. Meghan O’Sullivan says the new energy abundance 
reinforces well-functioning markets and increases the confidence of countries such as 
China in relying on markets for their energy security (rather than taking neo-mercantilist 
approaches).35 She argues that while the U.S. may be tempted to use its new energy 
                                            
35 O’Sullivan (n 1) p 132. 
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instruments as tools to promote foreign policy interests, well-functioning markets 
probably deliver the greatest benefit.36 
 
4.2.1 Liberalism and Energy Stability 
The alternative energy approach available to the U.S. is known as energy stability. An 
energy stability pathway argues that “the U.S. energy advantage should be used to 
enhance energy security around the world, on the theory that more stable energy 
markets will foster strong economies and enhance geopolitical stability.”37 In this way it 
can be seen to reflect a liberal approach to energy relations. The focus is on ensuring 
that U.S. production helps ensure that markets are well supplied and can function 
properly. By achieving this, an energy stability approach will foster economic 
interdependence and greater institutional cooperation, which promotes greater global 
stability and security. Strategies that can be adopted under an energy stability approach 
include promoting free trade of energy, creating multilateral sanction regimes, and 
promoting technology and information necessary to extract unconventional energy 
abroad. 
  
4.2.2 Limitations of Liberal Approaches to Energy 
Liberal accounts of energy relations tend to be more optimistic than their realist 
counterparts. They have a strong faith in the functioning of the market and believe in the 
potential of institutional cooperation to promote common good between its participants 
and reduce the geopolitical actions of states.38 In addition, liberal approaches tend to 
widen the focus beyond states to also include institutions, markets, and companies. Van 
de Graaf et al note that market liberalism sees energy “as a commodity like any other” 
and that it believes “energy markets are best left to themselves for the invisible hand of 
the market to bring all its benefits to.”39 However, at times this approach leads it to 
exhibit a low level of sensitivity to political factors and neglect the role that these play in 
                                            
36 Ibid, p 296. 
37 Ladislaw et al. (n 5) p 17. 
38 Stoddard (n 7) p 445. 
39 Van de Graaf et al (n 7) p 13. 
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energy markets.40 Kuzemko et al. say that “political factors that impact on interstate 
economic relations and on domestic and international energy policy choices are clearly 
insufficiently recognised by neoliberal analyses.”41 One of the implications of the 
tendency to downplay political factors is a relative inattention to power in market 
approaches. The market is seen as providing mutually beneficial transactions for all 
parties and in this way is said to be devoid of coercive influence. Stoddard says that this 
can lead to claims of idealism and over-optimism against market accounts.42 
 Luft and Korin are critical of liberal approaches to energy politics, particularly 
given what they see as the reality on the ground of volatile oil prices, rising geopolitical 
instability, and the increased assertiveness of energy exporters and their use of energy 
as a strategic resource.43 They believe there is a disconnect between this reality and the 
publicly stated policies that emphasise international cooperation and free markets. They 
say that liberal approaches have failed to check the emboldened postures of energy 
exporters, who threaten both energy and international security. 
 
4.3 Political-Commercial Relations in Foreign Policy 
There has been literature that has focused on the interaction between political 
and economic factors in the U.S. energy system but these have mainly concentrated on 
the influence of private oil companies on U.S. foreign policy.44 Daniel Yergin looked at 
the historical development of the relationship between oil companies and national 
security and strategy.45 Ran Goel examined the relationship between U.S. oil 
companies and the U.S. political system and argued that the American government’s 
ability regarding energy policy is restricted, be it in the pursuit of environmental or 
security policy objectives.46 However, the purpose of this paper is not to look at the 
                                            
40 Stoddard (n 7) p 445. 
41 Kuzemko et al. (n 7) p 3. 
42 Stoddard (n 7) p 446. 
43 Luft and Korin (n 24) p 335. 
44 See for instance: Ran Goel, ‘A Bargain Born of a Paradox: The Oil Industry’s Role in American 
Domestic and Foreign Policy’ (2004) 9(4) New Political Economy 467; Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic 
Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (Simon & Schuster 1991). 
45 Yergin (n 44). 
46 Goel (n 44) p 467. 
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influence of various groups in determining the contents of U.S. energy policy. Rather, it 
is to look at the policies enacted by the U.S. government that aim to capitalise on its 
new energy abundance and advance its international agenda, and assess the success 
or failure of these.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
5. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AFFAIRS 
 
Accounts of international energy relations which adhere to the divide between realist 
and liberal approaches tend to downplay the contributions of the other, whether they be 
realist accounts that ignore the multiplicity of actors and the impact of economic 
processes, or liberal accounts that place too much emphasis on the market and neglect 
political factors. As noted by Susan Strange, what is needed “is some analytical 
framework for relating the impact of states' actions on the markets for various sources of 
energy, with the impact of these markets on the policies and actions, and indeed the 
economic development and national security of the states.”47 Similarly Kuzemko et al. 
say that their approach “engages with states and markets, whilst avoiding a narrow 
focus on either” and “does not view states as the only, or even the dominant, actor in 
energy governance.”48 
 In this section, an approach to energy relations is presented that builds on the 
recent calls to bring energy back into IPE. The literature of Susan Strange, Robert Cox, 
Kuzemko et al., and Edward Stoddard is instructive and provides the basis of the 
approach described here. Pascual has also argued that the dynamics between energy 
markets and foreign affairs must be understood in order to navigate the new issues 
arising at the intersection of energy and geopolitics.49 Together with the limitations 
discussed in relation to the realist and liberal approaches to energy relations, this 
framework informs the empirical analysis in the case studies and allows the successes 
and limitations of the U.S. strategies to be identified.  
 
5.1 IPE Approach to International Energy Affairs 
Kuzemko et al., Stoddard, and Van de Graaf et al. have led the effort to bring energy 
back within IPE, and sought to build on the older works of Strange, Cox, and Bromley. 
Kuzemko et al. note that both Strange and Bromley called for the need to move beyond 
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the artificial separation between issues of political economy and those of geopolitics.50 
Stoddard utilises the insights of Cox and Strange to postulate a framework for the 
analysis of international energy affairs and this forms the basis of the framework used in 
this paper. Both Stoddard and Kuzemko et al. each outline similar frameworks, and 
these are relevant for the analysis in this paper. These are: (i) the need to consider both 
political and economic factors in the case of energy; (ii) the range of actors and the 
source of power under investigation; and (iii) an understanding of the state, interstate, 
and transnational interests in analysing energy affairs.  
 
5.1.1 A Political-Economic Approach 
Susan Strange called for any analytical framework of energy affairs to involve both the 
actions of states on energy markets, and also the impact that markets have on state 
policies and actions.51 As an international commodity, energy is closely related to the 
dynamics of markets. However, it is also a strategic asset that is of crucial importance to 
the functioning of states, notably their prosperity and security. In this way it is also a 
matter of political importance. Therefore, any analysis of energy affairs needs to 
consider both of these elements, without privileging one over the other. By doing this, 
we can properly analyse the impact of both markets and politics on energy policies and 
assess their strengths and weaknesses. Pascual recognises the importance of 
understanding the two-way interaction between politics and markets in determining how 
the strategic power of energy can be utilised in foreign policy.52 He says that “strong 
national policies require us to understand how nations might influence energy markets 
and how radical change in energy markets affects the national interests of countries.”53 
 
5.1.2 Multiplicity of Actors in Energy System 
An IPE approach to energy affairs addresses a broad range of actors. States are not 
viewed as the only or dominant actors. Van de Graaf et al. explain that the energy 
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system is driven by a huge range of actors and institutions, from governments, to 
multilateral organisations such as the IEA, to non-state actors such as businesses and 
NGOs concerned with energy.54 Cox’s analysis of Strange’s approach to power and 
actors in IPE is useful here in developing our analysis.55 Cox notes that Strange 
considered herself a realist, but not in the traditional sense of realism where there is a 
state-centred view of the world.56 Rather, Strange saw power as the basic concern of 
realism. This meant deciding where power lay and then asking who benefits. One of the 
reasons Strange adopted this viewpoint was that she considered the world as beginning 
to resemble the international order of the Middle Ages rather than the Westphalian 
system. Under such an order, cities, regions, and businesses all had their own power 
outside the authority of the state and could influence outcomes. Applying this to 
international energy relations, any framework of analysis needs to look at who holds 
power among the multiplicity of actors. By identifying where power lies, it is possible to 
show who has influence in the energy system and how this affects the other actors. 
 
5.1.3 Levels of Analysis 
Stoddard says that as international energy affairs occur at the intersection of the 
transnational economy and the interstate system, their analysis needs to be able to 
operate at a number of levels.57 This builds on Strange’s analysis which said that the 
“concentration on international organizations and on the politics of international 
economic relations has tended to let inter-governmental relations overshadow the 
equally important transnational relations.”58 By concentrating on interstate relations, an 
analysis could forego some of the most important actions occurring in the political 
economy. In the case of energy affairs, by considering the relationships between states, 
supra-state, and non-state actors, a more complete understanding of international 
energy relations and the impact of energy policies on each actor is achieved. 
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6. U.S. ENERGY STRATEGIES AND THE SHALE REVOLUTION 
 
The shale revolution and the resulting emergence of the U.S. as a major energy 
producer and exporter has presented the U.S with a powerful new leverage to advance 
its agenda globally.59 The question that arises is how the U.S. has sought to advance 
this new power. This section will look at the energy leverage and energy stability 
approaches the U.S. government has sought to use in order to advance its international 
agenda. Three policy areas/strategies addressed under each approach are analysed: 
energy trade, sanctions, and energy diplomacy. These approaches are subsequently 
analysed in each of the two case studies. 
 
6.1 Scope and Context 
The shale revolution has occurred over the last decade, meaning that President 
Obama was the first to have this new power in his toolkit. Obama’s administration 
sought to recognise the benefits provided by the new energy abundance, particularly 
the new strength it gave the U.S. relative to other nations and the ability it provided to 
assist U.S. allies. At the same, this administration was concerned with balancing these 
advantages against being a leader in the climate change battle. Boersma notes that 
with the transition to the Trump administration, while the rhetoric and tone has become 
more forceful, the contours of the policy approach has broadly continued in relation to 
oil and gas production and exports.60 However, the concern regarding balancing these 
with the need to address climate change has been dropped. Trump talks about ‘energy 
dominance’ and ‘unleashing’ U.S. energy on the world. However, Obama put in place 
much of the framework to allow this to occur, such as streamlining the export approval 
process for LNG and lifting the crude oil export ban in 2015.61 
The Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR) was created in 2012 by then Secretary 
of State, Hillary Clinton, as a response to the burgeoning energy production. Energy 
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was recognised as an important global issue and one in which the U.S. needed to 
develop coherent policy responses and diplomatic strategies in light of their new energy 
position. The ENR’s role is described as leading the “Department of State’s efforts to 
forge international energy policy, strengthen U.S. and global energy security, and 
respond to energy challenges around the world that threaten U.S. economic policy or 
national security.”62 Further, the shale revolution has led several important policymakers 
to elaborate on how energy resources can be utilised in diplomatic efforts. In October 
2012, Hillary Clinton noted that she “will be sending policy guidance to every U.S. 
embassy worldwide, instructing them to elevate their reporting on energy issues.”63 Tom 
Donilon, President Obama’s national security advisor argued in 2013 that the shale 
revolution allowed the U.S. to negotiate with other countries from a position of greater 
strength and that the U.S. should help other countries to increase their energy supply.64 
 
6.2 Energy Leverage Strategies 
 
6.2.1 Energy Trade and Energy Leverage 
An energy leverage policy in trade involves using energy trade in a protectionist, 
exploitative, or bilateral manner. Assertive policies that seek to enhance the relative 
power of a country are utilised. Among the possible ways in which the U.S could seek to 
leverage its energy trade are: starving markets, restricting exports, or selective exports. 
 Countries that are dominant energy suppliers can seek to use their dominance 
and the nature of energy as a strategic good as a means to exploit countries that are 
dependent on it for energy. They may seek to starve markets of energy in order to 
obtain strategic interests or politically-motivated outcomes. The classic example cited 
for this kind of behaviour is Russia and its supply of natural gas to countries in Europe. 
The gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, and the resulting 
supply disruptions in Europe, are often said to have been politically motivated as a 
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Russian response to the pro-Western government in Ukraine.65 A tactic that is more 
accessible for the U.S. is to restrict exports. Realist approaches to trade emphasise 
protectionism as a means to maximise wealth, independence and power. Rather than 
seeking to support global markets, the U.S. could utilise all of its energy production 
domestically (energy independence). This would reduce the economic burden of 
importing oil to the U.S. and increase its relative material capabilities.  
 A third energy leverage option that is most accessible to U.S. policymakers is to 
use targeted energy exports to support allies and weaken foes. This is particularly 
relevant for Europe, which is heavily dependent on gas exports from Russia. The U.S. 
can seek to use its increased LNG exports as a means to reduce Russian dominance in 
European energy markets. European energy security and diversifying Europe’s energy 
supply has long been a top U.S. foreign policy objective.66 From a trade point of view, 
the primary way in which this can achieved is through targeted trade agreements and 
investments in the Europe energy infrastructure. 
 
6.2.2 Limitations to the Energy Leverage Approach to Energy Trade 
Given that the U.S. does not yet exert energy dominance over any strategic rivals 
through its energy exports, the tactic of starving markets is not currently within its 
arsenal. In terms of restricting exports, the shale revolution has brought the politically 
enticing prospect of energy independence closer, particularly in relation to natural gas. 
However, in a global market a policy of energy independence does not make sense. 
Even if the U.S. did not import any oil from abroad it would still be vulnerable to supply 
disruptions or demand spikes elsewhere that cause price to increase. A restriction of 
natural gas exports would negate the benefits that accrues from creating a more 
integrated and global gas network. As was noted by the U.S. security advisory board: 
“U.S. energy independence is a myth… Even if oil and gas production growth enables 
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the United States to supply more of its own energy needs, global market and 
geopolitical trends will affect U.S. prices and the economies of our trading partners.”67  
While U.S. policymakers may be able to promote the targeted trade of oil and 
gas through particular regulations and investment decisions, there is still a clear limit on 
the extent to which they can control energy trade. In a liberalized, global market, the 
ability of political actors to control trade flows and investment decisions can be quite 
limited. The idea that simply being able to use the increase in production in a strategic 
way that is in U.S. interests ignores economic realities, and the variety of actors that 
control economic decisions. 
 
6.2.3 Sanctions and Energy Leverage 
Sanctions are primarily a coercive form of foreign policy that involve using economic 
might to advance international goals. They are one of the primary instruments through 
which states can seek to utilise energy in their foreign policy. Generally, the purpose of 
sanctions is to penalize countries or enforce changes in a target states’ behaviour in a 
way that satisfies the interests of the country imposing the sanctions. Sanctions play a 
critical role in the toolkit of U.S. foreign policy, especially in a world where military force 
is difficult to deploy and U.S. powers of persuasion are waning. 
Pascual’s ‘rules of six’ propose a framework for assessing the tools available to 
countries seeking to intervene in energy markets for reasons of national interests. 68 The 
two options for energy market intervention that relate to sanctions are blocking exports 
and constraining production.69 Pascual says that “interventions to block exports manifest 
themselves as sanctions on a country’s exports in order to deny that country markets 
and revenue.”70 An important factor in implementing such a tactic is the market scale of 
the producer that is the target of sanctions. Generally, the smaller the producer the 
easier it is to block their exports as their supply is not absolutely essential for market 
stability. Alternatively, some suppliers are so large that blocking their production would 
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not be feasible as it would be hugely complicated and lead to market instability. In such 
cases sanctions that aim to constrain future production are used instead. These 
sanctions block investment and trade in order to limit future growth. 
 
6.2.4 Limitations to the Energy Leverage Approach to Sanctions 
The U.S. faces limitations in its ability to use sanctions to advance its 
international agenda and a number of market factors are important here. First, given 
that U.S. imports of crude oil and natural gas have significantly decreased, its ability to 
use unilateral sanctions that target energy have significantly decreased. Second, as 
U.S. policymakers do not directly control U.S. production of oil and natural gas, its ability 
to utilise them in sanctions is limited. For example, policymakers cannot turn on the taps 
and increase production at short notice in the same way as Saudi Arabia can. Rather, 
policymakers can use the increasing levels of U.S. production through energy 
diplomacy (which relates to an energy stability approach). Finally, governments must 
assess the impact of possible sanctions on their national businesses and whether the 
sanctions will benefit the country and its commercial interests, and not just be for 
domestic political gain.71 
 
6.2.5 Energy Diplomacy and Energy Leverage 
The shale revolution provides a number of instruments for the U.S. to advance its 
foreign policy interests, particularly by providing U.S. diplomats with a powerful new 
narrative in their negotiations with other foreign officials.72 An energy leverage approach 
to energy diplomacy includes using America’s energy advantage and its energy exports 
to assist allies, bring countries into its sphere of influence, and push back against foes. 
In this way, it can be used to strengthen the U.S. balance of power and promote U.S. 
interests. European energy security and its dependence on Russian gas supply has 
featured heavily in U.S. diplomacy in this regard. U.S. diplomats have sought to 
convince their European counterparts that U.S. LNG exports will be available to 
European countries and that they should buy these to diversify their supply. 
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6.2.6 Limitations to the Energy Leverage Approach to Energy Diplomacy 
Boersma and Johnson note that “politically motivated calls for supply diversity are easy 
to make, but complicated to realise.”73 One issue with successfully using this approach 
is that diplomatic objectives can be overwhelmed by market realities. Decisions about 
when and where energy is sold are dictated by U.S. companies and the main motivating 
factor for them is price. These private companies are more likely to sell their supply in 
locations where they can get a higher price and make a greater profit. This limits the 
extent to which U.S. diplomats can direct energy resources to match their political 
objectives. Further, the market reality in the country that is the target of the diplomatic 
effort also influences the decision whether to diversify supply or not. Private companies 
are often responsible for decisions regarding where they secure their energy supply 
from and they will choose the most cost effective supplier. 
 
6.3 Energy Stability Strategies 
 
6.3.1 Energy Trade and Energy Stability 
An energy stability approach to energy trade broadly involves the protection and 
promotion of free trade with regards to energy, reflecting market liberal principles.74 
Under such an approach, the U.S. uses its increase in production to improve market 
liquidity either through exports or displacement, thus ensuring greater market stability. 
The OPEC oil embargo in 1973 led the U.S. to ban exports of crude oil for forty 
years (save for some limited exceptions). However, the improved energy position of the 
U.S. as a result of the shale revolution provided the catalyst for the lifting of the ban in 
December 2015. The lifting of the export ban allows U.S. production to be sold abroad 
and exports of crude oil have consistently increased since it was lifted.75 The primary 
implication of lifting of the ban for U.S. foreign policy is that it does away with the 
misconceived policy of energy independence, it gives the U.S. a new role in mitigating 
                                            
73 Boersma and Johnson (n 59) p 16. 
74 Ladislaw et al. (n 5) p 18. 
75 The latest data from the EIA shows U.S. exports of crude oil averaging over 2 mb/d at the end of May 
2018. EIA, ‘4 Week Average U.S. Exports of Crude Oil’ (June 24, 2018). 
28 
 
price volatility, and it removes a policy that was inconsistent with the general U.S. 
position in favour of free trade.76 
U.S. trade policy in relation to natural gas has also undergone significant change 
in recent years. The massive increase in production lowered U.S. gas markets prices 
and producers increasingly sought to export natural gas as LNG to markets in Asia and 
Europe where prices were higher. While the U.S. government does not control where 
natural gas is sold, it does control how fast producers can connect to outside markets 
through its LNG export permitting process. Approval for countries which have FTAs with 
the U.S. is basically automatic but for non-FTA countries it is a much more cumbersome 
process that requires a positive national interest approval from the Department of 
Energy (DOE) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). The non-FTA 
approval process steadily improved in recent years and has become more streamlined, 
particularly since the Obama administration was convinced that LNG exports were in 
the national interest and wouldn’t lead to a rise in domestic U.S. gas prices.77 
The U.S. is now one of the leading LNG exporters in the world and is a driving 
force behind the changing nature of gas markets and the diminishing power of 
traditional powers that have sought to politicise gas trade through pipelines such as 
Russia. The growing diversity of natural gas suppliers and the changing nature of the 
natural gas market to become more global has enhanced the stability of gas supplies for 
importing countries and helped depoliticize such imports. The U.S can use LNG exports 
to adopt an energy stability approach that focuses on increasing global supply and 
further integrating gas markets to become more global. 
 
6.3.2 Limitations to the Energy Stability Approach to Energy Trade 
There is a risk that political or other factors that inhibit free trade or restrict the 
production or supply of energy are ignored under an energy stability approach. First, the 
ability of the U.S. exporters to export to international markets depends on government 
regulation. For instance, government regulations banned the export of crude oil from the 
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lower-48 up until December 2015 and the LNG export approval process for non-FTA 
countries was much more cumbersome up until 2014/2015. Further, the ability of the 
U.S. to improve global energy security is currently being constrained by its own energy 
infrastructure. While tight oil and shale gas is being produced at record levels, pipeline 
and refinery capacity constraints are currently preventing that supply from reaching 
markets. Rick Perry, U.S. Secretary of Energy recently noted the need to continue to 
expand domestic transmission infrastructure.78 Recent developments have also shown 
the limited ability of U.S. tight oil supply to control oil prices in the face of geopolitical 
tensions. OPEC’s production cut, plunging supply from Venezuela, the withdrawal from 
the Iran nuclear deal (the JCPOA), and a supply outage in Libya, all helped to raise oil 
prices to three-and-a-half year highs in early July. Finally, political opposition under the 
Trump administration to free trade is a risk to an energy stability approach to energy 
trade. Rather, this administration prefers bilateral trade deals that enhance U.S. power. 
 
6.3.3 Sanctions and Energy Stability 
Sanctions are generally a coercive form of foreign policy and are associated with energy 
leverage as they seek to remove supply from the market. However two factors that 
determine the success of sanction regimes are related to an energy stability approach: 
coalitions and the ability to sustain. Given that the U.S. now imports significantly less 
crude oil and virtually no natural gas, its ability to influence foreign policy outcomes 
through unilateral sanctions is more limited. Rather, in today’s globalised economy, 
multilateral sanction regimes that incorporate a number of large importers are much 
more effective. If a tactic to block exports is to be successful, other major importers from 
the sanctioned producer must also cooperate.79 Likewise if production constraints are to 
succeed then there must be some compliance from financial entities that can block 
resources and technology to the sanctioned country. 
The ability to sustain relates to whether countries can sustain any intervention for 
a sufficient amount of time in order for it to have a significant impact. If interventions are 
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seen as being for the short term they are unlikely to have a major strategic impact. The 
new energy abundance is said to allow the U.S. to better implement sanctions against 
countries that are major energy producers as it allows it to build multilateral sanction 
regimes and use the increase in production to help replace any lost supply, and thus 
mitigate the risk of an increase in energy prices. 
 
6.3.4 Limitations to the Energy Stability Approach to Sanctions 
While multilateral sanction regimes may be more effective in achieving the desired 
foreign policy outcomes, and the shale revolution helps to better sustain such sanction 
regimes by improving market stability, political factors must also be considered. 
Multilateral sanction regimes often will not be possible given political divides between 
international actors. The key for creating such sanction regimes is to effectively utilise 
diplomacy to create some common ground on which parties with a variety of interests 
agree. The shale revolution certainly helps in creating common interests in sanctions 
relating to energy, but it will not always be successful in doing so. 
 
6.3.5 Energy Diplomacy and Energy Stability 
The U.S. can seek to use energy diplomacy in a way that is consistent with the energy 
stability approach by encouraging production of unconventional energy abroad. The 
thinking behind this is that by increasing unconventional energy in other countries, you 
increase their energy diversity, increase global supply in energy markets, and diminish 
the power of producers who use energy as a political tool. The U.S.-China Shale Gas 
Resource Initiative was announced in 2009. This initiative promised an assessment of 
China’s shale deposits and a program to provide the Chinese with information about 
how to develop and manage such resources.80 This initiative was extended to a much 
broader range of countries through the Global Shale Gas Initiative and the 
Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program. The U.S. government uses these 
initiatives to share technical knowledge and work with other countries to talk about the 
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regulatory, environmental, and financing aspects of shale production. Until now this 
program has not been an overwhelming success in terms of energy production. 
 The ability of U.S. officials to gain support for their sanction regimes is another 
aspect of the energy stability approach to energy diplomacy. One reason for the 
perceived failure of sanctions as effective foreign policy tools is that they are frequently 
unilateral. It is very difficult for one country to isolate another from the world economy on 
its own. However, U.S. officials can point to continual increases in U.S. energy 
production and the impact this has had on lowering energy market prices in their 
interactions with foreign officials. In turn, this makes it easier to create multilateral 
sanction regimes, which increase the chances that sanctions will be effective.  
 The shale revolution also provides U.S. trade negotiators with new instruments in 
negotiating free trade agreements, particularly regarding the potential of LNG exports. 
As LNG exports are permitted automatically for any country that has a FTA with the 
U.S., there is an added incentive for countries that are concerned about energy security 
or political coercion through energy to conclude FTAs with the U.S. Of course, the U.S. 
commitment to FTAs and free trade in general has diminished under the Trump 
administration. However, as U.S. LNG exports continually increase in the years ahead, 
its ability to use this instrument in trade negotiations will remain. 
 
6.3.6 Limitations to the Energy Stability Approach to Energy Diplomacy 
The success of U.S. policies to export the shale revolution abroad are limited by a 
number of obstacles. First, political and civil opposition in recipient countries to such 
programs must be considered. A number of European countries have banned shale 
energy production as it is associated with bad environmental practices. Second, rather 
than being seen as programs that are in the interests of the recipient country, they are 
viewed as vehicles to promote U.S. businesses abroad, particularly as U.S. embassies 
in foreign countries have helped promote U.S. private companies with expertise in shale 
energy production. Finally, the Trump administration has shown itself to favour bilateral 
trade deals that are concerned with increasing U.S. relative power, rather than 
benefiting the energy market. In this way, energy diplomacy is more likely to reflect a 
realist approach rather than a market-liberal one. 
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7. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
There has been much rhetoric regarding how the shale revolution can be leveraged by 
the U.S. to its advantage, particularly in advancing its international agenda. However 
there has been relatively little attention focused on developing an understanding of the 
strategies available to the U.S. that capitalise on the shale revolution and developing a 
theoretical framework that explains how best it can be utilised and where its limitations 
lie. The research in this paper has both an empirical and a theoretical aim that seeks to 
address these issues. First, the empirical objective is to examine the strategies 
employed by the U.S. in its external energy relations, the approach they reflect, and 
then evaluate whether these have been successful in advancing U.S. foreign policy 
interests. From a theoretical standpoint, the objective is to develop a political-economic 
framework useful for the analysis of U.S. energy strategies. The research seeks to build 
on recent attempts to bring the study of energy back into IPE such as Kuzemko et al 
and Stoddard. In this way, the research is aimed at theory development in line with the 
“building blocks” research procedure identified by George and Bennett.81  
 In order to achieve these research objectives, a multi-method research design is 
used that involves qualitative analysis through process tracing and cross-case 
comparison. Given the complexity of interactions that take place in the energy system, 
particularly between economic and political actors, process-tracing is well suited to 
examining the causal impact of the strategies adopted on the U.S. foreign policy goals. 
By adopting a cross-case comparison approach it is possible to identify how the same 
strategies have been applied in different cases where the U.S. wished to use its new 
energy abundance as a means of advancing its international agenda. This allows us to 
see any consistencies in how U.S. policies have changed as a result of the shale 
revolution and to assess their respective levels of success. The mixed method approach 
is favoured by George and Bennett: “there is a growing consensus that the strongest 
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means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-
case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program.”82  
 The energy leverage and energy stability approaches are the independent 
variables. Each of these approaches has a defined dependent objective in mind in 
terms of its impact on U.S. foreign policy, which is the dependent variable. The 
independent variables are analysed in each case to see whether they were effective in 
achieving the stated foreign policy objective. The various strategies adopted under the 
energy leverage and energy stability approaches serve as the intervening variables. 
The IPE framework outlined earlier in the paper is then used to analyse the variance in 
the variables and the outcomes. The limitations in these approaches are described by 
breaking down the barriers between economic and political analysis. This allows us to 
identify the failures in each specific approach and enables a more policy-relevant 
explanatory account that helps with future improvements.  
 A number of factors were considered in making the case selections in this 
research. First, it was crucial that there was a link between energy and the foreign 
policy objective in each case. Without this, there would be no role for the shale 
revolution. Secondly, the cases had to involve some link to the shale revolution, in terms 
of occuring in the period since the shale revolution began in 2008 and opening up new 
possibilities or strategies which had not previously been available to U.S. 
administrations. Thirdly, at least some (if not all) the strategies/policy instruments that 
are available under each of the energy approaches had to be present in some form in 
each case. Thus, cases were assessed based on how they related to energy trade, 
sanctions, and energy diplomacy. Finally, the case studies had to serve to highlight the 
theoretical divide between realist and liberal approaches to international energy affairs 
and how a political-economic framework of analysis is better suited for developing 
effective energy related policies. 
 Given these considerations, the cases selected for analysis are the the JCPOA 
and the case of natural gas in Europe. These are both cases where energy has played 
an important role and the U.S. has sought to utilise its new energy abundance in 
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advancing its wider U.S. foreign policy objectives. Both cases took place after the shale 
revolution started in 2008. There is a link to both energy aspects of the shale revolution 
in terms of the JCPOA being related to oil and the European case involving natural gas. 
Also, in both cases attempts have been made to utilise each of the three policy 
instruments, whether that be in a way that reflects an energy leverage or energy stability 
approach, or both. It is important to also note that there are a range of other factors in 
each case that influence the foreign policy outcome. However, for the purpose of this 
research, the focus will primarily be on the energy aspect of each case and assessing 
whether and how the strategies enabled by shale revolution influenced the outcome. 
As the research involves a cross case comparison, it was important to ask the 
same questions in each case in order to ensure comparable data was obtained. This 
was achieved by analysing each case from the point of view of the energy leverage and 
energy stability approaches and the three policy instruments available under each of 
these approaches. Each strategy is then evaluated on the basis of whether it assisted in 
advancing the foreign policy goal in each case, with the results being compared across 
both cases to show the success and limitations of each approach. This thesis relied on 
a documentary data collection strategy, with data gained from both primary and 
secondary resources. Primary resources included statistical data from energy 
organisations such as the IEA and EIA, energy company reports, official U.S. 
government documentation and reports including committee testimonies, speeches by 
U.S. government officials, and interviews conducted by media agencies with 
policymakers. Secondary sources were also relied upon to first get a lay of the land in 
the research, and then to help form the framework and argument adopted in the paper, 
as well as helping analyse the primary sources and the actions of government officials.  
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8. CASE STUDIES 
 
8.1 The Shale Revolution and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
 
8.1.1 Case Overview 
During the 1990s and 2000s, concerns grew within the U.S. and the wider international 
community regarding Iran’s nuclear intentions and its pursuit of a nuclear weapon. 
Attention turned to ways to bring Iran to the negotiating table for a discussion of its 
nuclear program and preclude it from gaining a nuclear weapon. From the mid-2000s 
the U.S. sought to prevent private businesses from doing business with Iran by 
imposing sanctions on trade, investment, and financial transactions. The purpose of this 
was to create economic hardship and internal unrest in Iran that would force it to 
negotiate with the international community. However, in order to be effective, any 
sanction regime would need to target the Iranian oil sector. Oil is the backbone of Iran’s 
economy, making up 50-60% of its government revenue in 2011.83 According to the 
EIA, Iran holds the world’s fourth largest crude oil reserves and in 2011 it was exporting 
2.5 mb/d.84 This made it the third largest exporter in the world at the time.85 At the start 
of 2012, with exports at 2.4 mb/d and the price of oil at roughly $100, Iran’s revenue 
from oil exports was $7.2 billion per month.86 
During the 1990s, previous attempts by the U.S. to create multilateral sanction 
regimes had failed as the U.S. was unable to convince others that the benefits of the 
multilateral sanctions outweighed the costs.87 Given the tight oil market and high prices 
that existed in the 2000s and early 2010s, the idea of sanctioning Iranian oil supplies 
seemed unlikely as global market would not be able to cope with the loss of such an 
important supply source and prices would rise even further. However, in late 2011 and 
early 2012, the United States and the EU imposed sanctions targeting Iran’s oil exports. 
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Among other measures, the sanctions banned Iranian oil imports to the EU and denied 
other countries and entities importing crude oil from Iran access to U.S. and European 
financial markets.88 Crucially, the U.S. was also successful in convincing Iran’s major oil 
importers to join the sanctions regime and reduce their exports in line with this. 
 The oil sanctions proved to be extremely effective in reducing Iranian oil exports 
and slashing its revenue. Iran’s net oil export revenue dropped from $95 billion in 2011 
to $69 billion in 2012.89 Iran’s oil and natural gas revenue was down to $33.6 billion in 
fiscal year 2015-2016, before rising back up to $57.4 billion in 2016-2017 following the 
implementation of the JCPOA.90 At their peak, the sanctions took 1.4 mb/d of Iranian oil 
off international markets.91 Pascual notes that given its need for high oil revenue to 
balance its budget, it became vital for Iran to return to international oil and capital 
markets and that this inevitably contributed to its willingness to conclude the JCPOA to 
limit its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief.92 Several policymakers and 
scholars cite the additional energy from the shale revolution as playing a key role in the 
JCPOA.93 
 
8.1.2 Energy Leverage Approach to Iran 
The strategies adopted by the U.S. in relation to energy and Iran did not primarily reflect 
an energy leverage approach. This is surprising given that the Iran nuclear case 
appeared to contain the classic conditions for a political realist, encompassing core 
security priorities such as the survival of the state from an adversarial and illiberal 
enemy.94 In terms of energy trade, the ability of the U.S. to use its own 
production/exports in a competitive, targeted way was limited. Given that Iran was one 
of the world’s largest oil producers and did not rely on the U.S. as a source of oil or gas 
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supply, the option of starving Iran of supply was not on the table. Nor was the U.S. able 
to use oil exports to target Iran or directly assist countries that were reliant on Iranian 
supplies as the U.S. export ban on crude oil was still in place at the time. The ban 
curtailed the ability of the U.S. to export to countries that were looking to replace lost 
supply from Iran. 
 The ability to use an energy leverage approach in relation to sanctions was 
relatively limited. Employing unilateral sanctions on the part of the U.S. would have 
been entirely ineffective given that the U.S. did not import any Iranian oil itself. In order 
for any sanction regime against Iranian oil exports to be successful, it would have to 
involve a multilateral sanction regime that included the primary importers of Iran’s oil. 
Diplomacy played a key part the JCPOA agreement, particularly in relation to 
energy. However, U.S. energy diplomacy in this case relied on a multilateral approach 
that focused on a broad range of political actors in the international system. The energy 
diplomacy used did not reflect an energy leverage approach as it was not used in a 
bilateral manner. 
 
8.1.3 Energy Stability Approach to Iran 
In what appears to be a departure from the traditional approach in U.S. foreign policy in 
favour of realist principles, the signing of the JCPOA and its attendant events are more 
reflective of the principles of liberal institutionalism.95 Hunt notes that a number of liberal 
factors were important such as “international cooperation between states, accruement 
of absolute gains, and institutional (rather than domestic) actors being central to the 
decision-making process.”96 This liberal approach is also evident in the way the U.S. 
utilised its new energy abundance in the case. 
First, while the U.S. approach to energy trade was still curtailed by the crude oil 
export ban (which was a protectionist measure and against the principle of free trade 
inherent in the energy stability approach), the increase in production in the U.S. was at 
least able to help global markets through displacement. U.S. import dependency was 
continually decreasing meaning that supplies normally bound for the U.S. could be sold 
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elsewhere, helping the general liquidity in the global oil market. This increase in supply 
in the U.S. and the displacement effect on global markets was also a crucial factor in 
the sanctions and energy diplomacy strategies. 
The shale revolution was a crucial factor in constructing the multilateral sanction 
regime that was imposed against Iran’s oil exports and helping sustain this regime in a 
tight oil market. Given that Iran was not an energy superpower like Russia or Saudi 
Arabia, the U.S. could impose a sanction regime that blocked Iranian exports rather 
than simply seeking to curtail production (although this was also a part of the overall 
sanction regime against the Iranian oil sector). However, in order for the U.S. led 
sanction regime to be successful it would have to involve the main importers of Iranian 
oil such as China (22%), the EU (18%), India (13%), Japan (14%), and South Korea 
(10%).97 The shale revolution helped to change the fear among these countries that any 
reduction in oil supplies would spark an oil price spike. Although it was for reasons 
completely unrelated to the sanctions against Iran oil and led by private companies that 
were following market factors rather than political ones, the shale revolution added 1 
mb/d to global supplies in 2012 and was crucial in convincing Iran’s major oil importers 
to participate in the sanctions regime and reduce their imports of Iranian oil. Tom 
Donilon noted that the economic conditions at the time were not favourable to imposing 
economic sanctions against Iran.98 Oil markets were tight and the world was just 
recovering from the financial crisis. However, Donilon said that the fact the U.S. had 
increased its own production by 1 mb/d was a crucial factor in deciding to go ahead with 
the Iranian sanctions.99 Every major importer of Iranian oil reduced their imports by 15-
20%.100 
The energy diplomacy strategy also demonstrates that an energy stability 
approach was adopted. As mentioned, in order for sanctions against Iran’s oil to be 
successful they would have to involve a coalition of its most important importers. U.S. 
diplomats undertook to convince these countries that they would be vulnerable if they 
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continued to import Iranian oil and that they would be able to reduce their imports of 
Iran’s oil without the risk of a price spike. A key message for these diplomats was to 
point to the continuous increases in U.S. oil production as a result of the shale 
revolution and the upward trajectory of this phenomenon. They argued that the increase 
in U.S. supply would offset for any Iranian oil that came off the market. Also crucial in 
this regard were diplomatic efforts with Saudi Arabia. U.S. officials pointed to public 
statements by Saudi ministers that they would tap their spare capacity to help make up 
for any lost Iranian supply.101 Richard Nephew, the lead sanctions expert in the U.S. 
team negotiating the Iran nuclear deal said that the during the negotiations they did not 
anticipate that oil from the shale revolution would be used to help the market offset the 
losses from Iran, but that when this did happen they were able to use it to make it easier 
for others to swallow Iran sanctions. Nephew says that this is the benefit from the shale 
revolution in terms of sanctions in that it adds to global supplies and makes it less likely 
that oil shortfalls from sanctions will be damaging.102 
 
8.2 The Shale Revolution and Natural Gas in Europe 
 
8.2.1 Case Overview 
It is generally recognised that as a commodity, natural gas is more susceptible to being 
used as a political tool than oil.103 Van de Graaf and Colgan say that Russia’s ‘energy 
weapon’ refers to its ability to “turn off gas supplies to Ukraine or other countries 
dependent on Russian gas in order to pile pressure on the targeted country and defend 
the interests of Moscow.”104 They note that the gas wars with Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 
are often interpreted as a political response to show Russian opposition to the Orange 
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Revolution and moves by George Bush to make Georgia and Ukraine NATO 
members.105 
As an important U.S. ally, European energy security and its dependence on 
Russia as a natural gas supplier has long been discussed in Washington.106 A key 
concern for U.S. foreign policy is improving European energy and political security by 
diversifying its energy dependence on Russia. This became particularly relevant after 
the expansion of the EU in 2004 and 2007, when a number of states joined that were 
significantly more dependent on Russia for their natural gas supplies than countries in 
Western Europe. The Russian gas disputes with Ukraine, the resulting gas disruptions 
in Europe, and the Crimea annexation in 2014 also increased concerns regarding 
European energy security and its vulnerability to Russia. The EU has not been totally 
inactive in trying to solve this issue itself and has been attempting to counteract this 
influence through strategies such as “market liberalisation and integration, 
strengthening the legislative and regulatory framework, supporting market functioning, 
and supply diversification.”107 While the market liberalisation and integration efforts have 
found some success, efforts at supply diversification have produced underwhelming 
results. Despite repeated political calls to reduce European dependence on Russian 
supply, in 2017 Gazprom exported a record volume of natural gas to Europe.108 For a 
number of years Washington has been concerned with assisting Europe in its 
diversification efforts. The shale revolution and the growing level of natural gas exports 
from the U.S. as LNG opens up new possibilities for the U.S. goal of diversifying 
Europe’s energy supplies. 
 Despite recognition in Europe that countries need to diversify their gas supplies, 
many have not been able to diversify away from Russian supply and capitalise on rising 
global gas supplies. Europe is currently importing 70% of its gas needs.109 The Russian 
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share of European gas imports in 2016 and 2017 was 39.5% and 37% respectively, 
making it the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU.110 Questions of supply and 
diversification will become even more pressing as European domestic natural gas 
production is set to decrease significantly over the coming years. 
 
8.2.2 Energy Leverage and Natural Gas in Europe 
There have been repeated claims from both the Obama and Trump administrations that 
America’s new energy abundance could be used to assist its allies in Europe and 
reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas, thereby reducing the political threat 
associated with this. This has primarily focused on the potential for U.S. LNG exports to 
replace Russian gas in Europe. 
Energy trade forms a huge aspect of the strategy to leverage U.S. LNG in a way 
that assists European allies. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014, along with the 
perception that Russia was increasingly using its energy to advance its geopolitical 
interests, led to greater interest and calls in the U.S. to utilise its new energy abundance 
to counteract this threat. There had been fears regarding the potential for natural gas 
exports to increase U.S. domestic gas prices but this concern was dispelled by a study 
commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy that looked at whether or not natural 
gas exports were in the national interest.111 The study found that increases in domestic 
natural gas prices would be limited under varying scenarios for natural gas exports.  
Following this report, President Obama set about promoting U.S. exports of LNG, 
particularly by streamlining the approval process for exports of U.S. LNG to non-FTA 
countries (see the Appendix I for a list of countries that the U.S. has an FTA in force 
with). The first LNG cargo was exported from the U.S. in February 2016 and exports 
have consistently risen since this as more export facilities come online. The increase in 
U.S. LNG exports has been surrounded by political rhetoric saying that U.S. LNG is 
being targeted at helping Europe diversify its energy supply. Amos Hochstein, the U.S. 
special envoy and coordinator for international energy affairs under Barack Obama said 
in 2016 that U.S. LNG exports to Europe would be used to offset the influence of a 
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newly aggressive Russia.112 Current Energy Secretary Rick Perry recently said: “Russia 
has enjoyed near-monopoly status as the main supplier of natural gas to our European 
allies, and wielded that power as a means of political coercion. Simply stated, the 
United States wants to help our partners increase their energy security by increasing 
the diversity.”113 A recent joint statement by European Commission President Juncker 
and President Trump agreed to strengthen EU-U.S. strategic cooperation with respect 
to energy by increasing EU imports of U.S. LNG.114 The statement notes that the EU 
would import LNG from the U.S. to diversify its energy supply and increase its energy 
security, and that the EU and the U.S. would work together to facilitate greater trade in 
LNG.115 
 The same joint statement from the EU-U.S. meeting also says that “the 
increasing gas production in the U.S. and the start of U.S. liquefied natural gas exports 
to the EU in 2016 have improved the security of gas supply in Europe.”116 However, a 
closer look at the figures raises questions about the extent of this claims. In 2017, the 
U.S. was the sixth largest LNG exporter to the EU, with 4% of Europe’s LNG coming 
from the U.S (Qatar, the largest supplier, supplied 41%).117 That the U.S. only supplied 
4% of Europe’s LNG imports is even less impressive given that total LNG imports made 
up only 14% of Europe’s total gas imports in 2017. Since LNG exports from the U.S. 
started in February 2016, 10.4% of total U.S. LNG exports went to 9 European countries 
including Turkey (see Appendix II for breakdown of where U.S. LNG exports go).118 
Thus, despite the political rhetoric and attempts to promote and increase LNG trade 
between the U.S. and the EU in order to diversify European reliance on Russian gas, 
U.S. LNG is not reaching Europe in massive quantities and Russia still remains the 
dominant gas supplier in Europe. 
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In terms of sanctions, the U.S. has imposed sanctions that have targeted the 
Russian energy sector in recent years, notably in response to the Crimea/Ukraine crisis 
and Russian meddling in the 2016 election. Rather than seeking to block exports like in 
the sanctions on Iran, the sanctions are aimed at constraining production capacity by 
targeting the future expansion of the oil and gas industry in Russia. While some of these 
sanction regimes have been multilateral and constructed in conjunction with the EU, the 
U.S. also acted alone in recent unilateral sanctions it imposed in August 2017 that are 
targeted against companies supporting or investing in Russia’s energy infrastructure. 
These sanctions reflect broad US opposition to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline but were 
not implemented against this project as the sanctions do not apply if the projects and 
agreements were initiated before August 2017, which was the case with Nord Stream 2. 
Despite the sanctions that have been imposed in recent years, it would appear that the 
ability to use the shale revolution as leverage for greater sanctions against Russia has 
not been a game changer. The fact that Europe is so dependent on Russian supplies 
reduces the potential for the U.S. to leverage the shale revolution. 
Along with energy trade, the other major area where an energy leverage 
approach has been adopted is in energy diplomacy. As mentioned, both the Obama and 
Trump administration made repeated statements regarding the power that the new 
energy abundance provides to America, particularly in assisting allies. Energy 
diplomacy is a core part of this strategy. U.S. diplomats in Europe have sought to 
convince their counterparts of the need to diversify Europe’s energy supply. The main 
narrative specifically enabled by the shale revolution has involved the promotion of U.S. 
LNG exports in European countries. However, as the statistics indicated above show, 
U.S. LNG volumes in Europe have been relatively low and not had a major impact on 
the European gas market yet. In addition to this, U.S. diplomats have also sought to 
help Europe with its efforts to liberalise and further integrate its gas market. This has 
involved promoting the building and leasing of LNG equipment in countries that are 
heavily reliant on Russia as a gas supplier such as in Poland and Lithuania. For 
example, prior to the renting of a floating storage regasification unit (FSRU) in Lithuania 
in 2014 it imported all its natural gas from Gazprom. This FSRU has mainly imported 
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gas from Norway but it has also two received shipments from the U.S., showing the 
potential for U.S. supply. 
 
8.2.3 Energy Stability and Natural Gas in Europe 
The energy leverage approach focuses on using U.S. LNG in a targeted way through 
trade and diplomacy to reduce European reliance on Russian gas supply. In contrast, 
the energy stability approach involves using the shale revolution in a cooperative 
manner that reduces Russian market share and political leverage through promoting 
free trade, greater market liberalisation, and knowledge sharing.  
 Rather than seeking to use its LNG exports in a way that targets the European 
market specifically, under an energy stability approach the U.S. would focus on using its 
LNG as a means of driving further integration and liberalisation of global gas markets. 
Unlike oil which operates in a global market, currently there are three primary markets 
for natural gas - North America, Europe, and Asia. Increasing LNG exports from the 
U.S., along with increasing global LNG supply from other suppliers such as Australia 
and Qatar, has led to gas markets becoming more global as the supply is more liquid 
and can be moved from one location to the other more easily. The separation of the 
markets based on continental regions has been driven by the fact that supply was 
traditionally delivered via pipeline to each region and couldn’t move between them. The 
LNG market changes this dynamic. Further, simply by increasing the level of supply on 
the global gas market, LNG helps to increase competition in gas markets and drive 
down prices. Russia has suffered particularly as a result of this by having to remove its 
long-term oil-indexed price contracts that it traditionally used in Europe, decreasing its 
revenue from gas exports. However, the shale revolution has played a key role in the 
removal of such oil-indexed contracts. This is because the abundance of natural gas in 
the U.S. led to a major decrease in spot prices on the Henry Hub gas market in the U.S. 
This created a situation where Russia was fearful of potentially losing market share in 
Europe to lower priced U.S. LNG unless it changed its pricing structures and 
agreements. Further, while U.S. LNG may not be flowing directly to Europe, its mere 
potential to flow in the case of disruption adds another new element to the Europe-
Russia relationship that increases European energy security. 
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 U.S. diplomats have been involved in significant energy diplomacy in Europe in 
recent years, where they have been seeking to support European efforts on supply 
diversification and market liberalisation. A particularly important strategy from an energy 
stability point of view has involved promoting the benefits of shale gas development in 
Europe. Programs such as the Global Shale Gas Initiative, subsequently known as the 
Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program, have provided inter-government 
advice and technical assistance regarding shale gas development. In the early years 
there were great hopes for a number of European countries regarding their potential for 
shale gas production, particularly in Eastern European countries such as Poland and 
Ukraine that were heavily dependent on Russia. However, the initial optimism has faded 
in recent years due to various factors. Geological issues made the extraction more 
complicated than initially expected. Further, there was extensive political and 
environmental opposition that constrained the projects. The criticism was also made 
that these projects were merely efforts to promote American companies abroad, rather 
than being in the interests of the targeted states. As a result, the volume of energy 
produced under this initiatives has not been substantial. 
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9. CASE ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, the primary results and observations from the two case studies are 
described. Following this, these results and observations are analysed using the IPE 
framework outlined in section five. The energy approaches and strategies adopted are 
considered in light of this framework in order to analyse the areas where they found 
success and where they were limited. This allows us to better understand how the U.S. 
can best use the shale revolution in order to achieve its foreign policy goals and where it 
faces difficulties. 
 
9.1 Results and Observations 
In the first case study the foreign policy goal was broadly achieved. The JCPOA was 
agreed between the P5+1, and this was regarded as being a strong step in preventing 
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. The energy approach adopted by the U.S. in 
utilising the shale revolution reflected an energy stability approach and was a factor in 
bringing about the conditions for the JCPOA. Crucially, this approach also reflected 
elements of the IPE framework and it is argued that this increased its effectiveness. 
In the second case study, the foreign policy goal has not been achieved. 
European reliance on Russian gas supply and its supply diversity has not changed in 
recent years despite a number of efforts by Washington to achieve this. The U.S. has 
primarily adopted an energy leverage approach in the strategies it has utilised to 
achieve this goal but these have not been effective. Energy stability approaches have 
been utilised less but also produced underwhelming results. It is argued that in this case 
the strategies adopted did not reflect the IPE framework. 
 
9.2 Political-Economic Approach 
The IPE frameworks for the analysis of energy affairs put forward by the likes of 
Strange, Kuzemko et al., and Stoddard call for a political-economic approach, where 
there is proper consideration of both the actions of states on energy markets, and also 
the impact that markets have on state policies and actions. There has to be a proper 
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understanding of how the economic and political processes interact in order to craft 
effective policies. 
 
9.2.1 The Shale Revolution and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
The energy stability approach adopted by the U.S. in utilising the shale revolution 
in relation to Iran demonstrated many elements that reflected such a political-economic 
approach. First, not only did the U.S. consider the impact that blocking Iran from oil 
markets would have on Iran’s economy and politics, but it also considered the risk that 
this action would have on the oil market and prices. Accordingly, the U.S. planned for 
the impact of price rises in the market resulting from blocking Iranian supply. The U.S. 
utilised its increasing oil production, as well as Saudi spare capacity and helping Iraq 
increase its own production, to reassure states that were fearful of price spikes. In this 
way, the U.S. was wary of the impact of its actions on the oil market, and also the way 
the oil market could respond to negate this impact. This was especially important given 
the tight oil market and high prices that already existed at the time. There was further 
consideration given to both politics and the market by inserting an insurance policy in 
the sanctions legislation that said the U.S. president could lift the sanctions if they were 
having an undue influence on prices in the market. Again, this helped reassure other 
countries that were worried about the sanctions leading to price spikes and impacting 
their economies at a time when they were weak. 
 
9.2.2 The Shale Revolution and Natural Gas in Europe 
The U.S. approach to the issue of European energy security and reliance on 
Russian gas supply has involved political rhetoric suggesting U.S. LNG will be used to 
directly assist the European allies and solve this issue. The recent announcement from 
the EU-U.S. summit further suggests that the U.S. sees the potential for U.S. LNG 
exports to help European gas diversity. However, this approach ignores the fact that 
policymakers cannot dictate trade. Decisions in Europe regarding choice of gas supplier 
are generally made by private companies acting in their own commercial interests. The 
clearest example of this is in relation to Nord Stream 2. Despite political opposition from 
the EU and the U.S, a consortium of five private companies from four different 
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European countries has teamed up with Russian gas supplier Gazprom to build a 
pipeline from Russia to Germany that will further increase European reliance on 
Russian gas supplies. The fact that Russian gas is cheaper to import than U.S. LNG - 
after fees for liquifying, transporting, and regasifying U.S. LNG are added on - means 
that Russian gas has a competitive price advantage over U.S. LNG in Europe. Second, 
the U.S. companies that control LNG exports are also driven by commercial interests. 
They sell their LNG to countries where demand for U.S. LNG is highest and it makes 
economic sense to sell to. Thus, the statistics show that over 40% of U.S. LNG goes to 
Asia where prices are higher and there is significant demand from China, which is 
seeking to move away from coal. 
The utilisation rates of European LNG regasification facilities shows the 
limitations of the energy leverage approach. 23 regasification exist in Europe for the 
import of LNG and in 2016 their utilization rates were less than 20%. This reflects the 
low rate of LNG imports into Europe in recent years, despite the political calls that LNG 
was a game-changer for the European gas market. Many of the regasification facilities 
were supported by the EU, showing the political motivation for such infrastructure. 
In terms of the energy stability approach to gas diversity in Europe, the U.S. 
approach of promoting unconventional energy production in Europe failed to consider 
the political and environmental opposition. This was an important factor in the ultimate 
failure of these initiatives to produce substantial volumes of gas. By not factoring in 
political opposition to such initiatives and purely focusing on the extent to which they 
could benefit the market, these initiatives failed to deliver their expected benefits. 
  
9.3 Multiplicity of Actors 
There are a huge range of actors within the energy system, ranging from states, to 
private corporations, to international organisations. When analysing international energy 
affairs it is vital to take account of its multiplicity of actors and their power and influence. 
 
9.3.1 The Shale Revolution and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
 In the first case study we see that the sanction regimes imposed against Iran 
were multilateral, involving Iran’s most important energy importers. The sanctions also 
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targeted private businesses and financial institutions. In this way, the sanction regime 
involved state and non-state actors. Further, given that the UN had imposed sanctions 
on Iran targeting its nuclear program, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) was also involved, there were a huge range of political and market actors 
involved. The shale revolution played an important role in creating this multilateral 
environment by providing the U.S. government with an opportunity to target Iran’s oil 
industry and allowing it to build support across multiple actors for this through its energy 
diplomacy. Therefore, in utilising its new energy abundance the U.S. recognised that it 
needed to be used to build support among states, the market, and international 
organisations. 
 
9.3.2 The Shale Revolution and Natural Gas in Europe 
 Under the energy leverage approach to European energy security, the multiplicity 
of actors and where power lies is being ignored. As mentioned several times, the shale 
revolution is driven by private companies operating in relatively open markets. The 
shale producers have most of the power in terms of how much energy is produced and 
where it is sold. The energy leverage approach fails to recognise this and instead sees 
U.S. policymakers as being able to direct U.S. trade to assist allies in Europe. Further, 
the rhetoric of U.S. policymakers suggests that its agreements with the EU will lead to 
increases in EU-U.S. LNG trade. Donald Trump recently commented that the “EU will 
be a massive buyer of U.S.” under the trade framework laid out.119 However, this fails to 
recognise that the EU is not responsible for buying LNG in Europe and that this is 
decided by private gas companies. 
 
9.4 Level of Analysis  
As international energy affairs occur at the intersection of the transnational economy 
and the interstate system, their analysis needs to be able to operate at a number of 
levels.120 Any IPE approach to energy affairs must consider transnational relations, as 
                                            
119 Allison Good, ‘Despite US-EU Pledge, LNG Shipments to Europe are at Mercy of Market Conditions’ 
S&P Global: Market Intelligence (July 26, 2018). 
120 Stoddard (n 7) p 450. 
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well as those between states. It is useful here to also draw on Hameiri and Jones’ 
critique of IR’s neglect of state transformation, which says that IR has overlooked that 
contemporary states are increasingly fragmented and decentralised and that sub-state 
actors are increasingly pursuing their own agendas overseas.121 
 
9.4.1 The Shale Revolution and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
 Again, we see this aspect of the IPE framework being utilised in relation to Iran. 
U.S. policymakers recognised that they didn’t control the level of production of tight oil. 
Instead this was controlled by private companies operating at a national and 
transnational level based on factors such as the market price. Accordingly, while the 
U.S. government was limited in the extent to which it control the level of production, they 
could utilise the benefit of this in their diplomacy and sanctions. Further by targeting 
banking and financial institutions, and also the shipping insurance market, a number of 
transnational economic actors were targeted and these were effective in isolating Iran’s 
economy from global markets. While this factor is not directly related to the shale 
revolution, it indicates an approach that is cognisant of the commercial and 
transnational relationships that exist in a globalised economy and the power of these. 
 
9.4.2 The Shale Revolution and Natural Gas in Europe 
The U.S. is now a net exporter of natural gas and its rate of LNG exports are increasing 
year-on-year as more export facilities come online. Despite this transformation in the 
U.S. energy position and the desire on both sides of the Atlantic to improve European 
energy security by reducing its reliance on Russian gas, U.S. LNG has so far not been 
able to exert much influence through trade or diplomacy. Rather, transnational 
interactions continue to have the upper hand in the European energy system. Again, 
Nord Stream is the best example of this. Despite significant opposition at the 
governmental level in the form of the EU and the U.S., Nord Stream 2 continues to 
progress and is expected to start delivering gas by the end of 2019. 
                                            
121 Shahar Hameiri, and Lee Jones, ‘Rising powers and state transformation: The case of China’ (2016) 
22(1) European Journal of International Relations 72, p 73. 
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10. CONCLUSION 
 
The shale revolution has transformed the U.S. energy position to one of energy 
abundance. There is no doubt that the U.S. is now more energy secure in terms of the 
traditional definition of energy security than at any point in the past few decades. The 
purpose of this paper has been to focus on the impact the shale revolution has had on 
U.S. approaches to international energy affairs and how it has sought to utilise its new 
energy abundance in advancing its foreign policy goals. This involved looking at the 
approaches, strategies, and policy instruments available to U.S. policymakers and 
analysing where they found success and where they faced limitations. In doing this, the 
theoretical basis of each of these approaches is described, and it is argued that an IPE 
framework is best suited for evaluating their success and failings. 
 The case studies show that where policymakers adopted an approach that was 
more reflective of the principles of the IPE framework, the foreign policy objective was 
easier to achieve. In the Iran case, many of the strategies adopted under the energy 
stability approach gave due consideration to political and economic factors, the range of 
actors, and the various levels of interactions that take place in the energy system. On 
the other hand, both the energy leverage and energy stability approaches adopted in 
the case of natural gas in Europe have been too state-centric or market-focused. Each 
approach privileged one of these factors without consideration of the other. Hence, the 
attempts to improve European gas diversity in recent years have not been successful. 
Unless policymakers understand the need to adopt an all-encompassing framework, 
their attempts to utilise the shale revolution to advance their international agenda will 
flounder. With the shale revolution, U.S. understanding of how and when to best 
advance its new found power will be vital to helping advance its international interests in 
the choppy geopolitical waters ahead. 
An interesting area for further research could be analysing the extent to which 
the dominant milieu in a state or region influences the energy approaches adopted. The 
focus in this paper was primarily on the strategies adopted by the U.S. and the impact 
these have had in helping with U.S. foreign policy goals. There is not much 
consideration given to the political environment in which the various approaches were 
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adopted or to the relative milieu goals that were dominant. Another particular area of 
interest to follow in the future is the impact of LNG on the global gas market and the 
extent to which it transforms gas markets to become more integrated. Will gas ever 
become a global market like oil? If the U.S. does wish to reduce the political influence 
that Russia has in Europe through its energy, the best course of action would appear to 
be supporting efforts to promote the liberalisation of the European gas market so that it 
becomes more competitive, with a greater diversity of suppliers, and a greater level of 
investment. The natural gas abundance in the U.S. and its increasing ability to export 
greater volumes of LNG can support this by adding to global supplies, making the 
market more integrated, and lowering global prices. This would be a further interesting 
area of research. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
U.S. FTA Agreement Countries 
 
The United States has free trade agreements in force with 20 countries. These are: 
● Australia 
● Bahrain 
● Canada 
● Chile 
● Colombia 
● Costa Rica 
● Dominican Republic 
● El Salvador 
● Guatemala 
● Honduras 
● Israel 
● Jordan 
● Korea 
● Mexico 
● Morocco 
● Nicaragua 
● Oman 
● Panama 
● Peru 
● Singapore 
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APPENDIX II 
 
 
U.S. Exports of Domestically Produced LNG 
(Cumulative starting from February 2016 through May 2018) 
 
 
Region Volume Exported 
(Bcf) 
Percentage 
Receipts 
of Total Volume 
Exported (%) 
 
Number of 
Countries Per 
Receiving Region 
 
East Asia and Pacific 534 40.8% 5 
Europe and Central 
Asia  
136.3 10.4% 9 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
421.2 32.2% 9 
Middle East and 
North Africa  
137.8 10.5% 5 
South Asia 78.8 6.0% 2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.0 0.0% 0 
Total LNG Exports 1308.3 100.00% 30 
 
Source: US Department of Energy 
